Friday, April 15, 2011

Vietnam payment card industry speeds up for 2011


Increasing service revenue is the focus of many banks in 2011. In that direction, payment card is the number 1 priority.

Maximising the competitive advantage and existing shareholder alliance are the solutions many banks are looking at.

According to BanknetVN, the current banking network has 11,000 ATMs, 42,000 POS terminals and over 40 issuing banks, with 27m payments card issued.

Card owners can use the ATM/POS network coverage over all the banks, instead of just conducting transactions at their bank ATM/POS.

3 largest card processing networks are BanknetVn, Smartlink and VNBC have succeeded in interconnecting its members, forming a payment network consisting of 42 member banks, over 8000 ATMs, which represent 90% of ATMs in the market.

The speed of development and the potential of the payment card industry is highly regarded. VCB currently has 4m domestic debit card, Dong A Bank has 3m card accounts. Just with a minimum account balance of 50k VND, banks have recruited a very large cheap deposit source through card service. Many later coming banks also have rapid growth in card issuance.

According PG Bank statistics, up until 31/10/2010, after a year of Flexicard introduction, the bank has issued 424,580 cards. Petrol card payment reaches 3629b VND.

However, even though there are more and more cards issued but the results have not been satisfying. According to a Nielsen survey, there are 23% debit cards users and only 1% credit card users, while 100% knows what ATM card is. This survey shows the ratio of credit card use is very low.

From mid 2010, SBV has pushed card processing through POS network, creating support for banks' card service. VCB, Eximbank, ACB, PG Bank... have carried out many promotion programs to develop card service and encourage their customers to pay by card. Foreign banks like HSBC and ANZA also stepped into the retail banking competition scene through promotions over web, email and direct calls to invite their customers to open card accounts.

In the race for card issuance, banks use their strategic alliance with mother companies. Petrolimex, a major shareholder of PG bank, has allowed their customers to buy petrol, withdrawal and deposit cash through card terminals at over 1800 petrol stations and more than 60 PG Banks transactional offices national wide. Flexicards are not only issued at the bank branches and transactional offices but also at Petrolimex petrol stations.

Currently ATMs are mainly used for cash withdrawal. To reduce the cash payment flow, there needs to be a wide adoption of POS networks. Petrolimex and PG Bank have indicated that they will join effort to develop POS network.

At the same time, banks will add more functionalities to the existing service and expand card payment service to department stores, supermarkets, schools, hospitals, taxi, bus and other public places...

Nguyen Quang Dinh, PG Bank Managing Director, says cash usage habit and the stiff competition from other banks require the bank to strive to stay ahead. Petrolimex also establishs that petrol card payment is one of their largest programs to encourage cashless payment and create a platform for unmanned petrol sale.

The join effort between the banks and retails creates the condition for the development of card payment industry in Vietnam. Together with the improved service, the consumers will benefit in their search for the better and convenience payment service.

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Mobile Payment Approaches

Mobile transaction costs are about 2% compared to Branch and IVR. Use of mobile services might also improve stickiness and customer retention, while lowering support costs.


Mobile is on track to rightfully take its place as the mainstream banking channel. Mobile banking is expected to overtake online banking soon, considering in June a user spent an average of 81 minutes per day on mobile apps vs. 74 minutes per day on the web. Mobile payments for digital and physical goods, money transfers and NFC(Near Field Communication) transactions are expected to reach $670 Billion by 2015v. PayPal expects to process $3 Billionvi in mobile payments this year alone that shows the popularity of mobile phones as a payment enabler, as well as positioning PayPal as one of the leaders in this space. Mobile payments have enjoyed widespread adoption overseas, especially in developing nations where the lack of infrastructure has accelerated this shift in customer payment modalities (e.g. M-Pesa in Kenya). Gartner’s latest research reportvii says mobile payment users worldwide will surpass 141.1 million this year, a 38.2% rise from last year, when users reached 102.1 million. Globally, the value of mobile payments is forecast to total $86.1 Billion, up 75.9% from last year’s figure of $48.9 Billion.

Mobile payments are currently synonymous with contactless technologies such as NFC despite the fact that NFC is not required as an enabler. Paying for physical or virtual goods as well as P2P money transfers are all possible today utilizing today's hardware and existing payment solutions. Two broad categories exist in the realm of mobile payments, namely remote payments and proximity payments. Remote mobile payments may be implemented using the existing financial payments infrastructure or using a closed loop mobile payments system. The much hyped NFC based payments support the latter, and mostly software solutions exist for the former, for e.g. PayPal. The most obvious differences between the two are speed, ease of use, and the fact that NFC payments use the existing financial payments processing infrastructure. Proximity payments may not require setting up payment processes or accounts with a trusted third party, and the payment data is linked directly to a payment card issued to the consumer by a trusted financial institution. Following, we present the three different approaches to NFC based proximity payment solutions that differ primarily on the placement of the NFC secure element (one’s encrypted payment card credentials) in the NFC enabled handset, whether its embedded in the phone hardware, on the SIM card or on a separate microSD card. Each approach has its own advantages and short falls, as listed below.

I. EMBEDDED SOLUTION:

In this approach, the NFC secure element is baked in to the phone hardware, such as in the case of the Google Nexus S, which comes with an NFC chip from NXP. RIM, Google and possibly Microsoft and Apple would prefer that the secure element be embedded on the phone so that they have access to invaluable customer spending preferences while positioning the handset makers to provide easier upgrade paths to newer handset models for customers.

Advantages include:
  • Provides a common architecture for content providers independent of the mobile phone technology – GSM or CDMA
  • Data encrypted while stored and remains encrypted for processing along the entire data path.
Example: A combination of the PN544 NFC controller along with an embedded SmartMX secure element was chosen for the Google Nexus S. It can also support SWP, which allows a mobile operator put a secure element in the SIM.

Disadvantages include:
  • Difficult to transfer applications to a new handset.
  • In the event of repair, even though encrypted, the secure element will be in someone else’s hands for an extended period.
  • Not many phones exist currently that support an onboard NFC Chipviii.
  • With each new device, applications will have to be re-tested, leading to delayed deployment.

II. SIM BASED SOLUTION:

Traditionally the SIM Card, which already plays a key role on handsets by identifying the subscriber and related account, was the ideal Secure Element of choice for supporting mobile payments. Its formidable security and OTA provisioning capabilities made it an ideal choice, but ultimately the evolving ecosystem blanched at giving too much control to a single stakeholder – the mobile operator. Control has slowly begun to shift from the mobile operator in to the ecosystem via external SE approaches and Trusted Service Managers (TSM). ISIS, an operator led initiative is a key example of a SIM based SE solution that started its life as an independent payments processor and morphed later in to a TSMix. Advantages include:

  • Preferred by MNO’s and controlled by the issuing party.
  • Meets security standards imposed by Financial Institutions
  • Faster deployment as this method is independent of handsets, current and future
  • OTA(Over-the-Air) Provisioning possible so that new applications can be downloaded remotely
  • In the case of a lost device, all applications on the SIM can be blocked (or unblocked)
  • Provides mobility for the consumer financial credentials
  • Can be segmented in to a number of security compartments to support multiple cards
Disadvantages Include:

  • Requires cooperation from the operator network
  • When multiple payment applications are present in one SIM card, questions arise as to who maintains control and visibility of credit cards from separate banks.
  • Ambiguity around the role operator networks will play in the ensuing transaction and whether they will opt for revenue sharing or a flat fee.

III. SECURE DIGITAL CARD BASED SOLUTION:

This approach commonly comprises of a self-contained SD Card/NFC antenna combo that allows the handset to communicate with contactless readers. An approach that stores the Secure Element on SD cards has the added advantage of being totally agnostic of operator networks and handset manufacturers. DeviceFidelity which provides a microSD card based Secure Element has partnered with VISA on its In2Pay microSD solution to offer NFC payment capabilities across VISA’s payWave platform. DeviceFidelity allows its microSD cards to be issued and personalized like traditional smart cards. It has partnered with Vivotech to add OTA provisioning capabilities to its In2Pay microSD productx.

Advantages include:
  • Rapid application deployment
  • Works with existing hardware
  • Agnostic of operator networks or phone hardware and therefore, preferred by Financial Institutions
  • Allows the Card Issuing Bank to own the secure element
  • Secure Element can stay in the microSD card while relying on the handset for NFC capabilities.

Disadvantages include:

  • No standard currently exists on secure communication between SD Card and Keypad/Screen
  • May mean multiple cards for multiple banks
  • Requires an available SD Card slot
  • Higher Cost and ambiguity over who will pay for the microSD card - customer or the issuing bank.

Tuesday, January 25, 2011

The end of plastic credit cards is coming

Mobile payments are expected to hit $214 billion by 2015. Transactions made by scanning a mobile phone at the register are forecast to reach $22 billion -- up from "practically none" last year.

NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- Credit cards may soon be as outdated as vinyl records. And this is the year that the slow, steady march to oblivion begins.

You can already use your iPhone, Droid or BlackBerry to buy a hotdog at the ballgame, buy your Starbucks latté, or give a friend a few bucks by Bumping phones. But by the end of the year you may not even think twice about reaching for your phone to pay at the register instead of fumbling for your credit card.

"Your plastic card hasn't changed since the age of the vinyl records," said Michael Abbott, CEO of Isis, a new mobile payment network. "This is the chance to bring payments forward from the plastic age and the vinyl records age to the digital age."

While companies have been experimenting with contactless mobile payments for years, 2011 is expected to be the year the technology really takes off. That's because millions of phones capable of making contactless payments are expected to be shipped out in 2011.

As a result, this pay-by-phone market is forecast to make up $22 billion in transactions by 2015, up from "practically none" last year, according to research firm Aite Group.

"Mobile payment is going to get really interesting and is going to see a lot of activity in 2011," said George Peabody, director of emerging technologies at Mercator Advisory Group. "We're going to start seeing more and more people leaving their homes without their wallets."

But that doesn't mean it's going to happen overnight, said Jane Cloninger, director at Edgar Dunn & Co., a consulting firm specializing in financial services and payments.

"I definitely believe that the mobile wallet will eventually replace the plastic card - but it's going to take some time because consumer habits take a long time to change," she said. "But where before it's been a lot of discussion, we're at the point now where you're going to start seeing momentum toward it and going to see it move beyond the trials and into reality."

Companies including Visa, MasterCard, Google, Bank of America, Citi and U.S. Bank are all testing contactless mobile payments, and many expect to roll out mobile wallets this year.

"2011 is going to be a very exciting, very dynamic year when it comes to mobile payments because it's the Wild West again, with all these players positioning in various different ways to redefine the digital payments landscape," said Michael Upton, senior vice president of online and mobile banking at Bank of America, which expects to launch it own mobile wallet later this year.

Meanwhile, AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon joined forces with Discover and Barclays in November to form Isis and provide a rival to Visa and MasterCard.

"It's a glorious competitive battle amongst some of the largest entities in the country," said Peabody.

The Isis mobile wallet will let consumers store multiple cards, make payments with the wave of their phone, check balances, receive coupons and use rewards points at the point of sale. But it may stretch beyond just the money in your wallet. Abbott sees the potential to include your insurance cards, driver's licenses, and other information typically found in a wallet.

"[Payment] is where we're going to start, but where it goes is wide open to the innovation of other players who want to be involved," he said.

Beth Robertson, a payments analyst at Javelin Research and Strategy, said that could mean developing ways for consumers to make contactless ATM withdrawals by simply waving a phone in front of an ATM as you would at the point of sale.

But because of just how much your smartphone now holds, it's quickly becoming your most dangerous device.

"We're increasingly living our lives on our cell phones...The problem is that we're not yet used to thinking about our wallet in terms of our phone," said Ed Goodman of Identity Theft 911. "No matter how good security on any type of mobile banking or payments, there are going to be people who are able to find a way around it - it's really all about making sure everyone ramps up their awareness."

Monday, October 25, 2010

Credit card growth sluggish in Vietnam despite incentives


High interest rates, annual fees and safety considerations have prevented the credit card industry from getting off to a roaring start in Vietnam, state media reported September 10.

Although both domestic and foreign banks have launched several promotion programs, they still have failed to attract enough customers to use credit cards for their shopping and other needs.

Because they expect the market to be a lucrative one in the future, the banks are pushing the use of cards so as to acquire and expand their market share.

The promotion campaigns have included direct marketing and the granting of credit cards without any fees.

Ho Anh Ngoc, head of retail banking in the southern region for Techcombank, said his bank plans to increase the number of its credit card users to 23,000 by the end of this year. It is targeting customers from all income segments.

Other banks such as Vietcombank, Eximbank, Asia Commercial Bank have launched their own promotions to expand the use of credit cards.

Customers travelling to Singapore between August 27 and September 30, can get a set of X-mini Capsule speakers from Eximbank if they spend at least US$500 using their Visa card over three days.

Phi Thi Phuong, head of Eximbank’s card management department said since early this year, Eximbank has issued 4,000 credit cards, increasing the total number of customers to 30,000 to date.

To attract more customers, international banks like HSBC and ANZ have sought to increase their market share by marketing on websites and through emails and phone calls to customers.

The banks have also linked up with trade centres and supermarkets to offer discounts for those using Visa or MasterCard for their shopping.

Hoang Long, who works for a transportation company in District 3, said he received an invitation to open a credit card from ANZ, but failed to get one because his monthly salary was less than VND5 million (US$256).

Also, late payments on a Visa card attract very high interest rates of between 1.5% and 1.9% per month, and this is something that gives pause for thought to Vietnamese clients.

HSBC and Techcombank levy overdue fees of 1.87% and 1.6% per month respectively.

Card owners also have to pay other kinds of fees.

Nguyen Tu Anh, director of Smartlink Card Joint Stock Co, said customers have to pay considerable attention to opening fees, annual costs, loan rates and exchange rates for international payments.

Hai Duyen, a regular customer of Techcombank, said credit cards were not all as safe as presumed. Recently, she had her pocket picked, and lost VND20 million (US$1,025) through her visa card.

Credit cards do not require any password like the ATM card. Thieves can use a forged signature, Duyen added.

Moreover, Vietnamese customers are still not used to using cards for their shopping, and prefer to use cash instead. Many shopping centres are yet to install POS machines to accept credit card payments.

At end-Oct 2009, local banks had issued 18 million bank cards with debit cards accounting for 98.13% and credit cards making up 1.83% and 9,000 ATM cards.

[Vietnamplus]

Monday, October 04, 2010

Credit Card Business Model


Probably the most common credit card business model is for customers to be charged a small annual fee in return for which they are able to make purchases using their card and to only pay for those purchases after some interest-free period – often up to 55 days. At the end of this period, the customer can choose to pay the full amount outstanding (transactors) in which case no interest accrues or to pay down only a portion of the amount outstanding (revolvers) in which case interest charges do accrue. Rather than charging its customer a usage fee, the card issuer also earns a secondary revenue stream by charging merchants a small commission on all purchases made in their stores by the issuer’s customers.

So, although credit cards are similar to other unsecured lending products in many ways, there enough important differences that are not catered for in the generic profit model for banks to warrant an article specifically focusing on the credit card profit model. Note: In this article I will only look at the profit model from an issuer’s point of view, not from an acquirer’s.

* * *

We started the banking profit model by saying that profit was equal to total revenue less bad debts, less capital holding costs and less fixed costs. This remains largely true. What changes is the way in which we arrive at the total revenue, the way in which we calculate the cost of interest and the addition of a two new costs – loyalty programmes and fraud. Although in reality there may also be some small changes to the calculation of bad debts and to fixed costs, for the sake of simplicity, I am going to assume that these are calculated in the same way as in the previous models.

Revenue

Unlike a traditional lender, a card issuer has the potential to earn revenue from two sources: interest from customers and commission from merchants. The profit model must therefore be adjusted to cater for each of these revenue streams as well as annual fees.

Total Revenue = Fees + Interest Revenue + Commission Revenue

= Fees + (Revolving Balances x Interest Margin x Repayment Rate) + (Total Spend x Commission)

= (AF x CH) + (T x ATV) x ((RR x PR x i) + CR)

Where
AF = Annual Fee
CH = Number of Card Holders
T = Number of Transactions
PR = Repayment Rate
ATV = Average Transaction Value
i = Interest Rate
RR = Revolve Rate
CR = Commission Rate

Customers usually fall into one of two groups and so revenue strategies tend to conform to these same splits. Revolvers are usually the more profitable of the two groups as they can generate revenue in both streams. However, as balances increase and approach the limit the capacity to continue spending decreases. Transactors, on the other hand, seldom carry a balance on which an issuer can earn interest but they have more freedom to spend.

Strategies aimed at each group should be carefully considered. Balance transfers – or campaigns which encourage large, once-off purchases – create revolving balances and sometimes a large, once-off commission while generating little on-going commission income. Strategies that encourage frequent usage don’t usually lead to increased revolving balances but do have a more consistent – and often growing – long-term impact on commission revenue..

Variable Costs

There is also a significant difference between how card issuers and other lenders accrue variable costs.

Firstly, unlike other loans, most credit cards have an interest free period during which the card issuer must cover the costs of the carrying the debt.

The high interest margin charged by card issuers aims to compensate them for this cost but it is important to model it separately as not all customers end up revolving and hence, not all customers pay that interest at a later stage. In these cases, it is important for an issuer to understand whether the commission earnings alone are sufficient to compensate for these interest costs.

Secondly, most card issuers accrue costs for a customer loyalty programme. It is common for card issuers to provide their customers with rewards for each Euro of spend they put on their cards. The rate at which these rewards accrue varies by card issuer but is commonly related in some way to the commission that the issuer earns. It is therefore possible to account for this by simply using a net commission rate. However, since loyalty programmes are an important tool in many markets I prefer to keep it out as a specific profit lever.

Finally, credit card issuers also run the risk of incurring transactional fraud - lost, stolen or counterfeited cards. There are many cases in which the card issuer will need to carry the cost of fraudulent spend that has occurred on their cards. This is not a cost common to other lenders, at least not after the application stage.

Variable Costs = (T x ATV) x ((CoC x IFP) + L + FR)

Where
T = Number of Transactions
IFP = Interest Free Period Adjustment
ATV = Average Transaction Value
CoC = Cost of Capital
FR = Fraud Rate

Shorter interest free periods and cheaper loyalty programmes will result in lower costs but will also likely result in lower response rates to marketing efforts, lower card usage and higher attrition among existing customers.

The Credit Card Profit Model

Profit is simply what is left of revenue once all costs have been paid; in this case after variable costs, bad debt costs, capital holding costs and fixed costs have been paid.

I have decided to model revenue and variable costs as functions of total spend while modelling bad debt and capital costs as a function of total balances and total limits.

The difference between the two arises from the interaction of the interest free period and the revolve rate over time. When a customer first uses their card their spend increases and so does the commission earned and loyalty fees and interest costs accrued by the card issuer. Once the interest free period ends and the payment falls due, some customers (transactors) will pay their full balance outstanding and thus have a zero balance while others will pay the minimum due (revolve) and thus create a balance equal to 100% less the minimum repayment percentage of that spend.

Over time, total spend increase in both customer groups but balances only increase among the group of customers that are revolving. It is these longer-term balances on which capital costs accrue and which are ultimately at risk of being written-off. In reality, the interaction between spend and risk is not this ‘clean’ but this captures the essence of the situation.

Profit = RevenueVariable Costs Bad DebtCapital Holding Costs – Fixed Costs

= (AF x CH) + (T x ATV) x ((RR x PR x i) + CR)(T x ATV) x (L + (CoC x IFP))(TL x U x BR)(TL x U x CoC + TL x (1 – U) x BHR x CoC) – FC

= (T x ATV) x (CR – L – (CoC x IFP) -FR) – (TL x U x BR) – ((TL x U x CoC) + (TL x (1 – U) x BHR x CoC)) – FC

Where
AF = Annual Fee
CH = Number of Card Holders
T = Number of Transactions
i = Interest Rate
ATV = Average Transaction Value
TL = Total Limits
RR = Revolve Rate
U = Av. Utilisation
PR = Repayment Rate
BR = Bad Rate
CR = Commission Rate
CoC = Cost of Capital
L = Loyalty Programme Costs
BHR = Basel Holding Rate
IFP = Interest Free Period Adjustment FC = Fixed Costs
FR = Fraud Rate

Visualising the Credit Card Profit Model

Like with the banking profit model, it is also possible to create a visual profit model. This model communicates the links between key ratios and teams in a user-friendly manner but does so at the cost of lost accuracy.

The key marketing and originations ratios remain unchanged but the model starts to diverge from the banking one when spend and balances are considered in the account management and fraud management stages.

The first new ratio is the ‘usage rate’ which is similar to a ‘utilisation rate’ except that it looks at monthly spend rather than at carried balances. This is done to capture information for transactors who may have a zero balance – and thus a zero balance – at each month end but who may nonetheless have been restricted by their limit at some stage during the month.

The next new ratio is the ‘fraud rate’. The structure and work of a fraud function is often similar in design to that of a debt management team with analytical, strategic and operational roles. I have simplified it here to a simple ratio of fraud: good spend as this is the most important from a business point-of-view.

The third new ratio is the ‘commission rate’. The commission rate earned by an issuer will vary by each merchant type and, even within merchant types, in many cases on a case-by-case basis depending on the relative power of each merchant. Certain card brands will also attract different commission rates; usually coinciding with their various strategies. So American Express and Diners Club who aim to attract wealthier transactors will charge higher commission rates to compensate for their lower revolve rates while Visa and MasterCard will charge lower rates but appeal to a broader target market more likely to revolve.

The final new ratio is the revolve rate which I have mentioned above. This refers to the percentage of customers who pay the minimum balance – or less than their full balance – every month. On these customers an issuer can earn both commission and interest but must also carry higher risk. The ideal revolve rate will vary by market and depending on the issuers business objectives but should be higher when the issuer is aiming to build balances and lower when the issuer is looking to reduce risk.

Saturday, September 18, 2010

Fraud Operation Structure of Credit Card Business


Fraud Protection in credit card business is a multi-faceted task that requires the input of several important teams. The three most active of these can broadly be called Fraud Operations, Fraud Analytics and Information Technology. This article will consider the relative “geography” of these teams and the internal structural requirements of each.

Fraud Operations is at the figurative ‘coalface’ of the fight against fraud. This is the team that monitors the queues of system-generated alerts, identifies suspicious transactions, contacts customers to confirm or allay those suspicions and performs the administrative work required when a fraud is confirmed – closing the account, listing its details on industry databases, processing charge-backs, etc. The success of this team is dictated by the efficiency with which it processes alerts.

If the success of Fraud Operations is dependent on the efficient execution of a given set of tasks, the success of Fraud Analytics is dependent on the inherent effectiveness of those tasks. This team is responsible for analysing implicit and explicit data to optimise fraud-detecting rules and systems. To do this well, the team must perform a mix of re-active and pro-active data analyses.

Re-active data analytics optimises the performance of the system by optimising the performance of its existing components, and does so in two important ways – the statistical review of historical data and the post-hoc reporting of fraud performance and trends. Historical data is analysed to identify embedded patterns that may be indicative of fraudulent spend. The results of such an analysis are then used to inform the design of the rules that will scan transactions and generate the alerts to be worked by Fraud Operations. Historical data is also used as the basis for management reporting and, in particular, the reporting of prevailing fraud trends and the recent performance to budget.

Pro-active data analytics, on the other hand, optimises the performance of the system by creating entirely new components. Historical data is still a key input into the process but the results of the analysis thereof are forward-looking and usually presented in the form of a business case or project proposal. So, where the results of re-active data analytics may inform an improvement in a particular fraud-detection rule, the results of pro-active data analytics may suggest a pilot project to test the value of SMS transaction alerts as an alternative to the rule altogether.

Linking these two teams is the IT team. IT maintains the systems on which Fraud Operations depend and implements the updates and upgrades suggested by Fraud Analytics. The role of IT is primarily to enable the efficient execution by Fraud Operations of the strategies set by Fraud Analytics. As such, their success is linked directly to the performance of the systems they maintain and which, should they fail, have the potential to undermine the performance of the other major stakeholders.

The specific roles and responsibilities of each of these teams should be clearly demarcated and used to inform the evaluation team performance and the recruitment process.


Friday, November 11, 2005

The American Express history and business model



American Express Company or AmEx, is an American multinational financial services corporation headquartered in Three World Financial Center, Manhattan, New York City, New York, United States. Founded in 1850, it is one of the 30 components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The company is best known for its credit card, charge card, and traveler's cheque businesses. Amex cards account for approximately 24% of the total dollar volume of credit card transactions in the US, the highest of any card issuer.

BusinessWeek and Interbrand ranked American Express as the 22nd most valuable brand in the world, estimating the brand to be worth US$14.97 billion. Fortune listed Amex as one of the top 20 Most Admired Companies in the World.

The company's mascot, adopted in 1958, is a Roman gladiator or Centurion whose image appears on the company's travelers' cheques and charge cards.

American Express was started as an express mail business in Albany, New York, in 1850. For years it enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the movement of express shipments (goods, securities, currency, etc.) throughout New York State. In 1882, American Express started its expansion in the area of financial services by launching a money order business to compete with the United States Post Office's money orders.

During the winter of 1917, the US suffered a severe coal shortage and on December 26 President Woodrow Wilson commandeered the railroads on behalf of the US government to move US troops, their supplies, and coal. Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo was assigned the task of consolidating the railway lines for the war effort. All contracts between express companies and railroads were nullified and McAdoo proposed that all existing express companies be consolidated into a single company to serve the country's needs. This ended American Express's express business.

American Express executives discussed the possibility of launching a travel charge card as early as 1946, but it was not until Diners Club launched their card in March 1950 that American Express began to seriously consider the possibility. At the end of 1957, American Express CEO Ralph Reed decided to get into the card business, and by the launch date of October 1, 1958 public interest had become so significant that they issued 250,000 cards prior to the official launch date. The card was launched with an annual fee of $6, $1 higher than Diners Club, to be seen as a premium product. The first cards were paper, with the account number and cardmember's name typed. It was not until 1959 that American Express began issuing embossed ISO/IEC 7810 plastic cards, an industry first.

In 1966, American Express introduced the Gold Card and in 1984 the Platinum Card, clearly defining different market segments within its own business, a practice that has proliferated across a broad array of industries. The Platinum Card was billed as super-exclusive and had a $250 annual fee (it is currently $450). It was offered by invitation only to American Express customers with at least 2 years of tenure, significant spending, and excellent payment history; it is now open to applications on request.

In 1987, American Express introduced the Optima card, their first credit card product. Previously, all American Express cards had to be paid in full each month, but Optima allowed customers to carry a balance (the charge cards also now allow extended payment options on qualifying charges based on credit availability). Although American Express no longer accepts applications for the Optima brand of cards, since July 13, 2009, Optima cards are still listed on the American Express website, as a reference to existing members only. According to American Express, Optima accounts were not converted or closed. However, Blue from American Express has prevailed as the replacement for the original Optima style of credit card. Blue includes multiple benefits free of charge, unlike Optima, including the Membership Rewards program.

In April 1992, American Express spun off its subsidiary, First Data Corp., in an IPO. Then, in October 1996, the company distributed the remaining majority of its holdings in First Data Corp., reducing its ownership to less than 5%.

In 1994, the Optima True Grace card was introduced. The card was unique in that it offered a grace period on all purchases whether a balance was carried on the card or not (as opposed to traditional revolving credit cards which charge interest on new purchases if so much as $1 was carried over). The card was discontinued a few years later; the now discontinued One from American Express card offered a similar feature called "Interest Protection....."

"Boston Fee Party"

From early 1980s until the early 1990s, American Express was known for cutting its merchant fees (also known as a "discount rate") to merchants and restaurants if they accepted only American Express and no other credit or charge cards. This prompted competitors such as Visa and MasterCard to cry foul for a while as the tactics "locked" restaurants into American Express.

However, in 1991, several restaurants in Boston started accepting and encouraging the use of Visa and MasterCard because of their far lower fees as compared to American Express' fees at the time (which were about 4% for each transaction versus around 1.2% at the time for Visa and MasterCard). A few even stopped accepting American Express credit and charge cards. The revolt, known as the "Boston Fee Party" in reference to the Boston Tea Party, quickly spread nationwide to over 250 restaurants across the United States, including restaurants in other cities such as New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In response, American Express decided to reduce its discount rate gradually to compete more effectively and add new merchants to its network such as supermarkets and drugstores. Many elements of the exclusive acceptance program were also phased out so American Express could effectively encourage businesses to add American Express cards to their existing list of payment options.

Currently, American Express' average US merchant rate is about 2.89%, while the average Discover, Mastercard, and Visa U.S. merchant rate is about 2%[citation needed] (Visa/MasterCard signature debit cards are at 1.7%) Some merchant sectors, such as quick-service restaurants including McDonald's, have special reduced rates to accommodate business needs and profit.

Typical credit card business model

When a consumer makes a purchase using a credit or charge card, a small portion of the price is paid as a fee (known as the merchant discount), with the merchant keeping the remainder. There are typically three parties who split this fee amongst themselves:

Acquiring bank: the bank which processes credit card transactions for a merchant, including crediting the merchant's account for the value charged to a credit card less all fees.

Issuing bank: the bank which issues the consumer's credit card. This is the bank a consumer is responsible for repaying after making a credit card purchase. The issuer's share of the merchant discount is known as the interchange fee.

Network: the link between acquiring banks and issuing banks. These banks have relationships with a network, rather than with each other, for fulfilling card purchases. This allows a card issued by a community bank in Peru to be used at a shop in Sri Lanka, for instance, without requiring the banks to have a direct relationship with each other. The two largest networks in the world are Visa and MasterCard.

The average merchant discount in the United States is 1.9%. Of this, approximately 0.1% goes to the acquirer, 1.7% to the issuer, and 0.09% to the network.

Most Prime and Superprime card issuers use the majority of their interchange revenue to fund loyalty programs like frequent flyer points and cash back, and hence their profit from card spending is small relative to the interest they earn from card lending.

How American Express differs

American Express typically plays the role of all three parties above, keeping the entire merchant discount. In recent years Amex has begun authorizing other banks to either acquire or issue on Amex's behalf, primarily in countries where Amex would otherwise have little or no presence.
Amex also has historically charged a higher merchant discount than Visa or MasterCard. The size of the premium can differ significantly: in the US, Amex charges 66 basis points more (2.56% vs 1.9%) than rivals Visa and MasterCard, while in Australia Amex charges more than twice as much as Visa or MasterCard due to Australian interchange regulations.

Amex uses this higher discount revenue to invest in rewards programs that provide a higher payout than competing programs. These more substantial rewards programs, in addition to a premium brand and a reputation for superior customer service, allows Amex to attract a disproportionate share of affluent consumers. Amex then uses its strength with affluent consumers to justify charging a higher merchant discount rate, implying that if a merchant does not accept Amex cards he or she will lose affluent customers. This business model creates a self-reinforcing loop.

Due to what Amex calls its "spend-centric strategy", card spending and fees are responsible for 70% of Amex's card profit, vs. 10–40% for other issuers. Amex also tends to make more money from annual fees than other issuers do.

One tension in Amex's business model is acceptance, a volume vs. margin trade-off. Because Amex charges a higher merchant discount fee, it is not as widely accepted as Visa or MasterCard. Amex's business model depends on having a higher discount fee, however, making it difficult to lower it. The company has to strike a balance, keeping its fee low enough to attract sufficient merchants, but high enough to fund rich rewards and drive its business model. In countries where Amex charges a small premium, like the US, it has near-parity acceptance, but its card rewards are not significantly more substantial than those of its competitors. In countries where it charges a large premium, its cards often have a much higher rewards payout than competing cards.

Many banks fund their lending, both card and otherwise, through deposits. Without deposits, however, Amex has historically funded its lending through outstanding travelers cheques (which function like non-interest-bearing deposits), the wholesale funding markets, and securitization. As travelers cheques have declined in popularity since the rise of ATMs, Amex has begun seeking traditional deposits through online high-yield savings accounts. The freeze in wholesale funding markets and securitization during the financial crisis of 2007–2010 caused Amex to accelerate these deposit-raising efforts, and also caused them to decrease growth in lending.
Due to its focus on affluent customers, Amex has historically had lower levels of credit losses than other issuers. The gap has almost disappeared for Q3'08 to Q1'09, however, as card issuers of all types experienced heightened credit losses.